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BOOK REVIEW
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT. SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW. By
Lenore J. Weitzman. New York: The Free Press. 1981. Pp. 536.
$17.95.
Reviewed by Linda S. Mullenix*
Within the first few weeks of law school almost every first-year law
student encounters the famous contracts case of Bafour v. Bafour.' In
Ba/four, the husband, a British civil engineer with a position in Ceylon,
promised to pay his ailing wife an allowance of £30 a month. When
the husband failed to pay, the court denied the wife recovery, explain-
ing "agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts alto-
gether. . . . In respect of these promises each house is a domain into
which the King's writ does not seek to run, and to which his officers do
not seek to be admitted."2
For contemporary, savvy students living in the post-Marvin3 era,
the Bafour case is something of a shock. Students are surprised to dis-
cover that agreements between spouses constitute "transactions outside
the area of contract exchange ' 4 and that marriage is a "relationship
that [does] not call for contractual recognition."5 For those who have
read the Marvin decision, the Bafour case is an anomaly: The Califor-
nia Supreme Court based its Marvin decision on the principle "that
adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting
their earnings and property rights."6 Is it possible, students wonder,
that unmarried cohabitants have the right to contract with each other,
but legally married spouses do not? Something seems amiss in contract
* Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School. B.A. 1971, City Col-
lege of New York; M. Phil. 1974, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University;
J.D. 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 2 K.B. 571 (1919). See . CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
PROBLEMS at 4-7 (1978); E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
TRACTS at 178-79 (3d ed. 1980); and A. MUELLER & A. ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION at 38-42 (2d ed. 1977).
2. 2 K.B. at 579, quoted in CALAMARI, supra note 1, at 6.
3. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
4. See MUELLER, supra note 1, at 33.
5. Id.
6. 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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law, especially when contract concepts are applied to the realm of do-
mestic relations.
Lenore J. Weitzman's book, The Marriage Contract Spouses, Lov-
ers and the Law,7 is an excellent and exhaustive treatise on the interre-
lationship of family law and contract law. The result of ten years
research on marriage and divorce,' Weitzman's book advertises itself as
providing "expert advice on writing a living-together contract for equal
partnerships, traditional marriages, remarried parents, homosexual
couples, and roommates who want to avoid 'palimony.'" The book
provides an incisive, critical analysis of the traditional model of mar-
riage and its regulation by current law.'0 The book's most significant
contribution is its argument that late twentieth-century social realities
have rendered anachronistic archaic legal assumptions concerning both
married and unmarried couples." In order to remedy the inequities
that arise from judicial discretion in the realm of domestic problems,
Weitzman suggests that the best method for governing relationships is
"intimate marital and nonmarital contracts."'
12
Clearly, Professor Weitzman has seen the future of domestic rela-
tions law to be in contract law, but it is in the case of intimate con-
tracts' 3 that Professor Weitzman's book is most disturbing and
frightening. It is unsettling to envision thousands of couples using The
Marriage Contract as a kind of fix-it manual for their relationship (not
unlike Dacey's How To Avoid Probate4 ), only to discover, at some
later date, that their intimate contract is an unenforceable, worthless
piece of wishful thinking.
Professor Weitzman, who is a sociologist although not an attorney,
7. L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT. SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW (1981).
8. See generall Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1181 (1981);
Weitzman and Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Dfference?, 14
FAM. L. Q. 141 (1980); L. Weitzman, No-Fault Divorce in California, (1979) (unpublished
manuscript) (available from the Center for the Study of Law and Society Library, Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley); L. WEITZMAN, SEX ROLE SOCIALIZATION, (1979); Weitzman
and Dixon, Child CustodyAwards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patternsfor Child Custody,
Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 473 (1979); L. Weitzman, The Legal
Regulation ofMarriage: Tradition and Change-A Proposalfor Contracts Within and in Lieu
of Legal Marriage, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974).
9. See WEITZMAN, supra note 7, at book-jacket.
10. Id. at Part I, "The Legal Tradition: Terms of the Traditional Marriage Contract," 1-
135.
11. Id. at Part II, "Legal Assumptions Versus Social Reality," 135-225.
12. Id. at xxii-xxiii, 225-26.
13. Id. at Part III, "The Case for Intimate Contracts," 227-55.
14. R. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE (1965).
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has written a legal "how-to" manual replete with sample agreements
and contract provisions.15 Her book is dangerous because many read-
ers may skip the legal analysis and proceed straight to the model con-
tracts. Her caveats, however, are grossly inadequate to warn the reader
of the potential legal pitfalls in the sample agreements. As will be dis-
cussed below, these illustrative draft instruments are fraught with legal
peril, particularly to the naive, the trusting, and the legally illiterate.
Professor Weitzman's book is potentially harmful in that it offers dubi-
ous legal advice through official-sounding, jargon-laden, model inti-
mate contracts.1 6 As such, these "contracts" are the weakest and least
valuable portion of the book.
The first half of the book is a sociological survey of the laws relat-
ing to traditional marriage 7 and is the best-argued portion of this mas-
sive examination of domestic relations law. Professor Weitzman
cogently demonstrates the inadequacies of the traditional marriage
model, where the husband is the head of the family with the responsi-
bility for spousal and child support"8 and the wife is the household
manager with responsibility for the children.19 This traditional model
of marriage has resulted in the legal sanctioning of sex-based roles, as
well as the inequitable assignment of various rights and duties during
marriage and at dissolution." After a thorough analysis of the "terms
of the traditional marriage contract, ' 21 Weitzman argues that most
people would be better off with a contract designed and executed by
themselves, instead of getting married or living together without a con-
tract.22 For those already married, she urges that the partners draw up
a contract within the marriage as an alternative to the marriage con-
tract imposed by law.23
Weitzman argues that at marital dissolution the most equitable
system of domestic relations law would recognize that virtually all as-
15. There are three sections of Weitzman's book which provide sample contract provi-
sions. Chapter 11 contains a descriptive list of over twenty-five "Topics and Provisions for
Intimate Contracts." Chapter 12 contains "Case Studies: Ten Contracts Within and in Lieu
of Marriage," which are actual agreements drafted by couples in a variety of different rela-
tionships and living arrangements. The Appendix, "An Empirical Study of Intimate Con-
tracts," is a summary of the various contract provisions drafted by fifty-nine sociology
students at a University of California campus, as part of their course requirements.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 10.
18. WErrzMAN, supra note 7, at 5-60.
19. Id. at 60-134.
20. Id. at 134-89.
21. Id. at 1-135.
22. Id. at xxiii, 225-26.
23. Id.
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sets acquired during a marriage, except for inherited assets, are prop-
erty.24 Thus, distributable property would include a variety of "career
assets" that have monetary value, in addition to traditional property
like income and real property. Among such career assets are profes-
sional education, business and professional goodwill, life insurance and
pension benefits.25 Moreover, the most equitable system of property
distribution is based on community property principles, now embraced
by only eight states.26 "Community property principles are strongly
recommended for all states," urges Weitzman, "because they would
most effectively bring the law into line with the ideals of most couples
entering marriage, and would most truly reflect the partnership ideals
that family law seeks to encourage. 27
Professor Weitzman's sociological analysis effectively demon-
strates that late twentieth-century social realities are inconsistent with
the legal assumptions underlying the traditional model of marriage.
For example, many young couples no longer expect to live together
"until death do us part" and mistakenly believe that their property will
be divided evenly when they separate and dissolve their marriage.
Weitzman argues, therefore, that because of the contemporary high
rate of divorce, society should "at minimum, have legal provisions for
marriage contracts, term marriages, and limited-purpose marriages for
persons wilshing alternatives. 28 In addition, two reforms are needed:
(1) The law should recognize the partnership nature of marriage and
the wife's contributions to assets acquired during the marriage, and
(2) The law should provide better economic protection "for women and
children who are casualties of the current laissez-faire system of
divorce."29
The high rate of divorce is but one contemporary social reality that
has caused crisis in domestic relations law. In addition, the traditional
model of marriage fails to consider a variety of alternative life-styles.
Thus, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, homosexual couples, and
family communes are often ill-served by the courts.30 For example,
24. Id. at 89 & 97.
25. Id.
26. The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas and Washington. Puerto Rico is also a community property jurisdic-
tion. See Freed and Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. Q. 229, 249
(1981).
27. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 97.
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id See also Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Child Support Awards,
supra note 8, for a detailed empirical study of the impact of divorce awards in California.
30. WErrzMAN, su.pra note 7, at 190-223.
[Vol. 15
BOOK REVIEW
onerous alimony or support awards make little sense in the typical
poor, matriarchal black family, while child custody rules frequently
run afoul of the shared parenting philosophy inherent in communal
living experiments. Traditional family law often imposes inappropriate
burdens and responsibilities and sometimes penalizes people "for not
living up to middle class norms."' I For Professor Weitzman, the best
alternative is a contract model which would allow people of different
classes, races, and ethnic diversity "to structure their relationships in
accord with their own norms and values."32
Professor Weitzman's thesis is that contract law should replace the
subjective, discretionary system of domestic relations law that now reg-
ulates marital and nonmarital status in all states. "Increased judicial
recognition of contracts would. . . provide a route to reforming and
updating our antiquated system of family law."' 33 There are four major
advantages to the substitution of the contract model in the realm of
domestic relations. First, couples would be able to formulate agree-
ments that conform to social reality. Second, intimate contracts would
enable couples to escape from sex-based assumptions concerning rights
and duties within their relationship and establish a more egalitarian
partnership. Third, couples would be able freely to order their per-
sonal relationship as they wished, in privacy. And fourth, the use of
the intimate contract would allow unmarried cohabitants to formalize
their relationship. 34 Thus, contracts offer "the option of creating a per-
sonally-tailored structure to facilitate their [a couple's] goals and
desires. 35
Contracts are ideally suited to help resolve conflict in on-going re-
lationships, as well as lessen conflict at the time of dissolution. A well
written contract will contain some mechanism for resolving differences,
hopefully before disputes grow to such serious proportions that they
endanger the relationship. An example of one such mechanism is the
Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County, which offers counseling ses-
sions to resolve disagreements between marital partners before they be-
gin dissolution proceedings. 36  The Conciliation Court uses a
"Marriage Agreement" as a tool in its counseling, and the final docu-
ment which the couple agrees to is signed and has the status of a court
31. Id. at 203.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 228.
34. Id. at 227-28.
35. Id. at 229.
36. Id. at 235-36.
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order. Technically, the Agreement is enforceable through contempt ci-
tations, but this rarely occurs: The Agreement has more value as a tool
of moral persuasion. 7 As an alternative to the possibility of judicial
enforcement, couples might wish to adopt a concept of arbitration, sim-
ilar to that in labor law, or to provide for mandatory marriage
counseling. 8
Weitzman's thesis that the traditional model of marriage is anti-
quated is well argued, and her suggestion that intimate contracts sup-
plant the subjective judicial review of family law judges is thoughtful
and provocative. If the book were limited to this analysis, it would
constitute a valuable contribution to the literature of family law. Pro-
fessor Weitzman goes further, however, and proposes that couples
enter intimate contracts now, as though her suggested changes in the
law have already been implemented. They have not. The major prob-
lem with Professor Weitzman's proposal is that many of these recom-
mended intimate contracts probably are not enforceable. While her
sociological analysis is intelligent and perceptive, her legal argument is
shaky, at best.
Professor Weitzman recognizes that the contracts she advocates
must be viewed in light of certain caveats, but in general, she is quite
sanguine. "Some dramatic shifts in judicial rules in recent years sug-
gest that these contracts are now increasingly likely to be recognized as
valid and binding," 9 citing to five cases from Florida, Illinois, Oregon,
Nevada, and California.4° In light of these five decisions, Professor
Weitzman broadly concludes that "[A]lthough these courts thus far
have dealt overwhelmingly with cases involving support and property
on divorce, the new legal doctrines established by their decisions may
easily be extended to agreements affecting ongoing marriages. 41
Professor Weitzman asserts that these cases have opened the door
for the enforceability of some intimate contracts and have established
new principles for reviewing contracts between marital partners. Thus,
such contracts will be viewed as valid legal agreements, provided that
37. Id.
38. Id. at 412. "Couples who want to be assured of settling disputes that arise during
their relationship may wish to borrow the concept of arbitration used in labor law or to
provide for marriage counseling in their contracts."
39. Id. at 337.
40. Id. at 347-52. The five cases Weitzman discusses in support of her thesis are: Posner
v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 257 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 1972); Volid v. Volid, 6 111. App. 3d 836, 286 N.E. 2d 42 (1972); Buettner v. Buettner, 89
Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719 (Or. 1973); and In re
Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
41. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 347-48.
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they meet the test of traditional contract standards. In addition, both
property and support are valid subject matters for contracts between
spouses, and marital partners now have the same freedom to contract
as other parties.42 Weitzman concedes that no court has yet upheld a
husband's attempt to contract away his support obligation during mar-
riage, nor has any court upheld a contract in which a husband agrees to
pay his wife a salary for her domestic services.4 3 Nonetheless, Weitz-
man believes that in light of the new trend in domestic relations cases,
"it is almost certain that these courts would uphold an agreement to
pay the wife for her domestic services with a property award (instead of
a salary) provided the contract was negotiated in accord with tradi-
tional contract standards."' Finally, the Marvin decision clearly il-
luminates the way for intimate contracts between both married and
unmarried partners: "Marvin extended the contractual rights of parties
in both types of relationships. In fact, Marvin has meant that both
married and unmarried partners now have a far better chance of hav-
ing their agreements upheld in a court of law."
45
Professor Weitzman's analysis of the trend of domestic relations
law with regard to contract enforceability is frightening, particularly
since this analysis impels her to urge existing and future couples to
enter into contracts as the fairest and best method of ordering rights
and duties within personal relationships.
Unless her legal analysis is correct, Professor Weitzman's advice is
ill-conceived. And her legal analysis is suspect for many reasons. To
begin, Professor Weitzman is incorrect in suggesting that Marvin has
given both married and unmarried partners a better chance of having
their agreements upheld in court. Although the Marvin decision has
engendered a great deal of novel litigation, the success rate of Marvin -
type claims has not been high because the litigants generally cannot
demonstrate the adequacy of traditional contract requirements.46
42. Id. at 351-52.
43. Id. at 352.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 411.
46. See Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981); Morone v.
Morone, 407 N.E. 2d 438, 439 (N.Y. 1980), af§'d, 413 N.E. 2d 1154 (1980); McCall v.
Frampton, 415 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1979); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E. 2d 453 (IIl. 1978), rev'd, 394
N.E.2d 1204 (1979). Some recent analyses dealing with the contract implications of the
Marvin decision are: Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment; From Status to
Contract and Back Again? 77 MICH. L. REv. 62 (1978); Branca and Steinberg, Antenuptial
Agreements Under California Law: An Examination of the Current Law and In Re Marriage
of Dawley, 11 U.S.F.L. REv. 317 (1976); Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: Race,
Marriage, and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1978); Reppy, Debt Collection
19821
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Moreover, the significant post-Marvin trend has been for courts to limit
the applicability of Marvin. For example, in California, courts have
refused to extend the spousal immunity privilege in criminal trials to
unmarried couples.4 7 Similarly, one unmarried partner has no stand-
ing to sue for the wrongful death of the other.'1 In the area of taxation
and decedents' estates, the courts have ruled that the surviving partner
of a Marin relationship is a "Class C" (unrelated stranger), rather than
a "Class A" (surviving spouse legatee). Thus, the tax burden of the
surviving partner was significantly increased.49 An unmarried cohabi-
tant was denied the right to recover for loss of consortium, even though
the cohabitating couple was engaged to be married at the time of the
tortious injury to one of the partners.5 Similarly, the courts have re-
fused to allow an unmarried cohabitant who witnessed the negligent
killing of his partner to recover damages for emotional distress.5
Thus, the Marvin experience in California, as well as in other
states, has been to take a very narrow view of the rights of nonmarital
partners. 2 It seems difficult to conclude, from this bleak pattern, that
"married and unmarried partners now have a far better chance of hav-
ing their agreements upheld in a court of law."51 3 Yet this is precisely
what Professor Weitzman concludes, on very slim evidence and a high-
ly selective reading of a few decisions from a small number of states.5 4
The case for the enforceability of contracts between marital part-
From Married Californians: Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Manage.
ment, and Invalid Marriage, 18 S.D.L. REv. 143 (1980); Shultz, Contractual Ordering 0fMar-
riage: A New Model For State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 207 (1982).
47. People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1979). The court held that
the marital privilege concerning communications between spouses, under CAL. EvID. CODE
§§ 970, 971 (West 1967), did not apply to ummarried couples.
48. 4 CAL. FAM. L. REP. No. 3, at 1 (Feb. 18, 1980) (Los Angeles County trial ct.);
Harrold v. PSA, 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981) (cohabitant not an heir in
wrongful death action); Vogel v. Pan Am, 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (meretricious
spouse cannot sue for wrongful death in airline crash); but f Bulloch v. United States, 487
F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (cohabitant entitled to recover for loss of consortium).
49. Estate of Edgett, 111 Cal. App. 3d 230, 168 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1980); see also Aspinall v.
McDonnell Douglas, 635 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1981) (definition of heir not expanded by Mar-
vin decision).
50. Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141 (N.J. 1982) (affianced status insufficient as basis
for recovery of loss of consortium); Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1978) (denial of consortium damages after tortious injury). See Comment, Loss of Consor-
tium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examination of Tong v. Joeson, 14 U.S.FL. REv. 133
(1980).
51. Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
52. See REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 278-80 (1980).
53. WEITZMAN, supra note 7, at 411.
54. See supra note 40.
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ners is even more attenuated than that for unmarried partners. As
Weitzman herself concedes, marital partners still cannot contract away
their support obligations nor agree to pay one another for household
services.5 5 Parents cannot contract away a child's right to receive sup-
port, nor can they contract concerning child custody in the event of
divorce, since in most jurisdictions child custody is a matter in the
court's discretion: The child will be placed in custody in accordance
with the judge's determination of the child's best interest.5 6 Other mat-
ters are clearly beyond contractual control: for example, various gov-
ernment benefits for spouses, designated as "spousal" benefits by law,
such as social security.57 Yet Weitzman disregards this legal reality
and asserts: "While some of these benefits of marriage are accorded
only to those who have the status of a spouse. . . in many cases the
same results may be achieved through a private contract." 58
In the final analysis, Weitzman can point to only two areas where
courts have actually enforced agreements between spouses: property
distribution and alimony.5 9 But these court decisions are hardly novel,
nor do they signal any significant new trend; courts have always been
willing to uphold and enforce duly-executed antenuptial and postnup-
tial property agreements between spouses.6" Indeed, under well-estab-
lished community property principles in California, a husband and
wife are not bound by the statutory definitions of separate and commu-
nity assets. They are free to contract concerning management powers
55. WEiTZMAN, supra note 7, at 352. Notwithstanding that no court has yet enforced
such an agreement, Professor Weitzman optimistically concludes: "It is almost certain that
these courts would uphold an agreement to pay the wife for her domestic services with a
property award (instead of a salary) provided the contract was negotiated in accord with
traditional contract standards." Id.
56. Id. at 414. As will be discussed below, a number of the sample contracts in the book
do contain provisions concerning child custody at dissolution, and it is highly questionable
whether a court would enforce these provisions where other factors compelled a different
custody arrangement.
57. Id. at 232-33. Professor Weitzman believes parties ought to be able to contract con-
cerning these statutorily mandated benefits as well: "While one might argue that an individ-
ual ought to be allowed to designate their beneficiaries, in much the same manner that they
can designate the beneficiary of a private insurance policy, the public policy issues raised by
this argument are beyond the scope of this book." Id. at 233.
58. Id. at 232-33.
59. See supra note 40.
60. See generally REppy, supra note 52, at ch. 3; RITCHIE, ALFORD AND EFFLAND, DE-
CEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 175-78 (6th ed. 1982); KRAUSKOPF, MARITAL AND
NONMARITAL CONTRACTS: PREVENTIVE LAW FOR THE FAMILY (1979); Clark, Antenuptial
Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 142 (1979); Comment, Husbandand Wfe--Antenuptlal Con-
tracts, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1133 (1943).
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and ownership rights.6' Moreover, the couple can contract concerning
the property status of some, but not all, of their assets; for example,
they can contract to hold their residence in joint tenancy. "One of the
most common forms of marital property agreement," notes a commu-
nity property expert, "is the contract to live separate in property, i e.,
[the husband and wife] will own and control property under the law
applicable to them as if they were not married."6 "
Professor Weitzman's trend, then, is reduced to four cases dealing
with antenuptial agreements in which contracting spouses stipulated to
a sum of alimony in a case of divorce.63 What these cases suggest is
that some courts have repudiated the premise that alimony agreements
incite divorce. Quite simply, these courts have concluded that "public
policy is not violated by permitting these persons prior to their mar-
riage to anticipate the possibility of divorce and to establish their rights
by contract. . . as long as the contract is entered with full knowledge
and without fraud, duress or coercion."' Moreover, these four ali-
mony decisions are hardly novel when viewed in the context of dece-
dents' estates law, because courts have long upheld both antenuptial
and postnuptial agreements between partners concerning property set-
tlements at death.65 Perhaps all that these four cases signify is that it is
difficult to distinguish the enforceability of contracts in contemplation
of death from the unenforceability of contracts made in contemplation
of divorce. Finally, Professor Weitzman has cited no case that en-
forced an intimate contract during the course of the marriage, rather
than at death or dissolution.
Predicated on this overly optimistic view of the direction of do-
mestic relations law in the coming years, Professor Weitzman's book is
principally devoted to ten case studies of actual contracts between mar-
ried and unmarried couples and an empirical study of intimate con-
tracts drafted by a group of fifty-nine sociology students at the
University of California in 1977.66 In addition, the book describes in
61. REPPY, supra note 52, at 29.
62. Id.
63. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970) (antenuptial agreement concerning
alimony), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Volid v. Volid, 6
M11. App. 3d 836, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972) (antenuptial agreement stipulating lump sum settle-
ment at divorce); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973) (antenuptial agree-
ment specifying alimony and property rights at divorce); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719
(Or. 1973) (antenuptial agreement concerning alimony).
64. Volid v. Volid, 6 Il1. App. 3d at 392, 286 N.E. 2d at 47, cited in WEITZMAN, supra
note 7, at 349.
65. See supra note 60.
66. See supra note 15.
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lengthy detail twenty-five categories of topics and provisions for inti-
mate contracts.67 Weitzman notes that while some people may wish to
write a contract solely as a statement of philosophy or intent, "more
will want to construct a legally enforceable agreement. ' 68 Therefore,
she cautions her readers to consider the legal caveats discussed in later
chapters, which are precisely those chapters that contain the rosy prog-
nosis of the enforceability of these intimate contracts.69
Professor Weitzman's warning is inadequate and a trap for the un-
wary; nowhere in her analysis does she indicate which contracts and
specific provisions are legally unenforceable. While most first-year law
students could probably quickly identify the various problems in her
sample agreements, the layman has no way of knowing which provi-
sions will withstand judicial scrutiny. In short, almost all the model
contracts can be eviscerated on traditional contract principles, leaving
the parties confused, if not embittered, by their attempts to substitute
their notions of rights and duties for the law's. The sample contracts in
this book may be desirable to couples as statements of their hopes, but
they are of dubious value for the larger number who want a true
contract.
The most fundamental problem with most of the sample contracts
is that they are not really contracts in the technical sense, as a lawyer or
a court would recognize. A contract is generally defined as a promise
or set of promises "for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."70 As
will be discussed below, there simply are no remedies available for
many of the suggested contract provisions, nor in many of the cases
67. WEITZMAN, supra note 7, at 255-91. Among the contract provisions recommended
are: general purpose of the contract; legalities; parties; aims and expectations; duration;
work and careers; income and expenses; property currently owned and acquired during the
marriage; debts; domicile and living arrangements; responsibility for household tasks; sur-
name; sexual relations; personal behavior and ways of relating; relations with family, friends
and others; decision to have children; plans for raising children; religion; health and medical
care; inheritance and wills; liquidated damages; resolving disagreements; changing, amend-
ing and renewing the contract; and dissolution. Id.
68. Id. at 257.
69. Id. Weitzman refers her readers to Chapters 13, 14 and 15: "Parties who want their
contract legally enforceable would be wise to consider the caveats discussed in those chap-
ters." Weitzman also recommends that the contracting parties include a severability provi-
sion to ensure that the unenforceable provision does not render the entire contract void,
yet few of the sample agreements include such a severability clause. Id; see also sample
contracts in Chapter 12.
70. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1977); SIMPSON, CONTRACTS ch. 1 (2d ed.
1965).
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would the law recognize as a duty some of the performances agreed to
by the parties. The contracts are filled with precatory language and
ambiguous provisions. Some suggested clauses violate current statu-
tory or constitutional provisions. In short, a number of the agreements
are either void, voidable, or unenforceable. Thus, some of the con-
tracts are void because the law does not provide a remedy in case of
breach nor recognize a duty of performance.7 Other agreements are
voidable because one or more of the parties can elect to avoid or ratify
the legal relations in the contract.72 Many of the provisions are unen-
forceable because they are incapable of being sued upon or proved by
one or both of the parties."3
The major difficulty with many of the contract provisions sug-
gested by the sample agreements is the lack of definiteness. A contract
will fail for indefiniteness if it is impossible for the court to tell what
has been promised; therefore, it is difficult to supply a remedy for fail-
ure to render a promised performance.7 4
The sample agreements in Weitzman's book abound with vague
and indefinite terms. For example, in one contract, Nancy agrees to
give up her career aspirations as a dancer and to support her husband
David through medical school. In return, the agreement provides "she
expects financial security, the assurance she will enjoy the usual bene-
fits of being a doctor's wife. . . and a future interest in David's ca-
71. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, CONTRACTS § I-1- (2d ed. 1977); SIMPSON, .spra note 70,
at Ch. 1 § 7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at § 2-13; SIMPSON, srupra note 70, at ch. 3 §§ 43-51. Examples of fatal indefinite-
ness include such promises as to pay an employee "an appropriate share of the profits," or,
in addition to a salary, "a reasonable amount." Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N.Y. 60,
162 N.E. 584 (1928) and Gaines & Sea v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 163 Ky. 716, 174 SW.
482 (1915), cited at SIMPSON, supra note 70, at 67. Other examples of indefinite promises
that are unenforceable include agreements "to build a number of houses"; to divide profits
"on a very liberal basis"; to pay "good wages" to a teacher, or to pay "a liberal and substan-
tial bonus." Fly v. Cline, 49 Cal. App. 414, 183 P. 615 (1920); Greater Service
Homebuilders' Investment Ass'n v. Albright, 88 Colo. 146, 293 P. 345 (1930); Fairplay
School Tp. v. O'Neal, 127 Ind. 95,26 N.E. 686 (1891); Varey v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 111
N.E. 822 (1916), cited at SIMPSON, supra note 70 at nn.5, 18 & 20. The problem with this
language is that it is so vague that the meaning cannot be determined with reference to any
objective criteria. Similarly, it is well recognized that a contract will fail for indefiniteness
where the parties attempt to define the time in which performance is to be rendered, but
express this in such a fashion that their intentions cannot be determined. SIMPSON, supra
note 70, at ch. 3 §§ 46 & 48. Moreover, where a contract suggests continuing performances
by the parties, "in the great majority of cases [these] agreements.. . without termination
date are construed as terminable at the will of either party, and so not contracts in the sense
that they create any executory duties." Id. at § 48.
BOOK REVIEW
reer." 75 What exactly has David promised in this provision? Can a
court possibly determine what is the required performance on David's
part? What is "financial security," or "the usual benefits of being a
doctor's wife?" More importantly, if David fails to keep his part of the
agreement, what possible remedy can the court order? If money dam-
ages are incalculable or inappropriate for breach of this promise, can
the court order specific performance by David? Does such a remedy
run afoul of the thirteenth amendment?
The contract between Nancy and David is filled with aspirational
(and inspirational) language that would leave a court bewildered and
helpless. Other examples:
Nancy realizes that she will have to work hard and make due
with very little money while she supports David. Further, she
understands that David's studies will be time-consuming, and
that he will be a less than ideal companion. However, she is
willing to sacrifice these short-run benefitsfor David's guarantee
of a better tomorrow.
76
David, in this agreement, has apparently guaranteed a "better to-
morrow"-surely, one of the vaguest contract terms imaginable. Al-
though he perhaps has made a foolhardy promise, he is not without
recourse, however, because Nancy has agreed (according to the sample
contract):
[T]o devote her talents to nurturing him and their children
and to create the type of elegant and beautiful home that only
Nancy's presence could create.7
How is a court to determine if Nancy has performed or failed to
perform on this contract term? If David decides that Nancy is not living
up to her portion of the agreement, what possible remedy can they or-
der? Since Nancy presumably has neither income nor assets to com-
pensate David for her inadequate domestic skills, can the court order
the specific performance of an elegant and beautiful home?
In addition to vague and indefinite contract terms, the sample con-
tracts are filled with precatory language; that is, language that is advi-
sory or in the form of a recommendation or request, rather than a
positive command."8 But what is a court to make of all this aspirational
language? The most egregious examples of precatory language are con-
75. WEITZMAN, supra note 7, at 296.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339-40 (4th ed. 1951).
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tained in the sample contract between Barbara and Robert, an already
married couple:
Barbara and Robert desire to continue their marriage and
to make it a full and equal partnership.
The parties share a commitment to the process of negotia-
tions and compromise that will continue to strengthen their
equality in the partnership.
The parties hope to maintain such mutual decision-mak-
ing . ...
The parties acknowledge their desire to maintain a mo-
nogamous sexual relationship. They, therefore, agree to be
sexually faithful to each other.7 9
Having agreed to remain sexually faithful to each other (can the
court enforce this?), Barbara and Robert also acknowledge that each
would be jealous or upset if the other became involved with another
person. To deal with this possible eventuality, Barbara and Robert
agree, in part, that:
[If] Robert's activities cause Barbara undue anxiety (even
if they are innocent and or helpful to his work), he will
change his plans.
At the same time, Barbara will try to become a more
trusting person. 0
It should be quite evident that no court will get into the business of
assessing Barbara's "undue anxiety" or compelling Barbara to become
"a more trusting person." Barbara and Robert do not have a contract;
they have paper that states their hopes and fears, and their agreement
to seek marriage counseling if things do not work out."'
79. WErrZMAN, supra note 7, at 308-09 (emphasis added). There are numerous other
examples of precatory language in the sample contracts: "We hope that we can teach our
child to know the joys of caring deeply for others as well as taking seriously the quality of
his or her own life. We hope that our child will come to understand the world and act in a
useful and just manner. We hope that our child will have a terrific sense of humor about it
all"
80. Id. at 309.
81. Id. at 311. Their agreement provides that in the event of any unresolved conflicts




As concerns the regulation of sexual relations, it seems highly du-
bious that any court could enforce many of the provisions suggested
because of public policy or statutory prohibitions. Indeed, some of the
suggested terms seem to violate ninth amendment protections concern-
ing privacy rights:
Children will be postponed until David's education is
completed.
If Nancy should become pregnant prior to that time, she
will have an abortion. 2
Responsibility for birth control will be shared equally.
Susan will have this responsibility for the first six months of
the year, Peter for the second six.
If Susan decides to have an abortion, the party who had
responsibility for birth control the month that conception oc-
curred will bear the cost of the abortion.
8 3
Even more surprising is the contract drafted by two lawyers in lieu
of marriage. This agreement, which they specify "is entered into with
the firmest intention that we be mutually and legally bound" and "in
our professional judgment . . . [is] ...a judicially enforceable con-
tractual relationship"84 contains the following provision with regard to
sexual relations, children, and child raising:
We recognize the central importance of sex in human re-
lationships and commit ourselves to putting time and creative
energy into realizing our sexual potential.
We agree to attempt to have a child.
In deciding to bring a child into our lives, we commit
ourselves to making the space to know and enjoy that
person.
85
The legal questions surrounding these "contract" provisions are
obvious: What does the language mean? Are there promises here that
a court could enforce? Are there any legally recognizable duties for
82. Id. at 298.
83. Id. at 304.
84. Id. at 324.
85. Id. at 321.
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which the court could provide a remedy for non-performance? What
possible remedies could the court order? The conclusion is clear: there
are no legally enforceable contract terms expressed by these
aspirations.
In addition to problems concerning indefiniteness, precatory lan-
guage, and statutory and constitutional prohibitions, the sample agree-
ments contain numerous problems of contract interpretation. For
example, some provisions are ambiguous:
Since Peter expects to become a psychologist, he will be-
come the primary parent for the first child.86
In the event that Robin becomes financially successful as
a painter and earns enough to support them both throughout
the year at the equivalent of double their current annual in-
come of $6,000 a year, then Robin agrees to assume the re-
sponsibility for all living expenses.87
Do these contract provisions contain conditions? Are they condi-
tions precedent or subsequent? Were conditions intended by the par-
ties? If Peter does not become a psychologist, for example, but a
mailman, is he relieved of his obligation to become the primary parent
for the first child? If Robin earns $10,000 a year as a painter, does he
have any responsibility for living expenses?
Without belaboring language problems further, the sample con-
tracts are also perilous because they contain various provisions which
clearly are contrary to statutory or common law rules. Thus, notwith-
standing the best intentions of the parties, no court would enforce the
following agreement: "If we cannot agree on custody, we will deter-
mine by random lot which parent gets custody at what time."88 Simi-
larly unenforceable is the provision that "no financial or other
responsibilities will continue between the parties after separation and
division of their community property." 89 It seems clear that until the
law is changed, either by legislation or judicial decision, parties cannot
simply contract away certain legal rights and duties. Yet this is pre-
cisely what many of Weitzman's couples attempt to do.
Professor Weitzman has envisioned a brave new world of contracts
and all the wonderful people in it. Her vision, however, is frightening
86. Id. at 305.
87. Id. at 316.
88. Id. at 322.
89. Id. at 319.
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to anyone conversant with basic contract principles, and most impor-
tantly, is anathema to the courts who would be asked to enforce her
model contract provisions. Professor Weitzman has clearly identified
the inadequacies of current domestic relations law to deal with contem-
porary family realities. Yet the solution she proposes, the substitution
of intimate contracts, will not help the people she desires to aid. In
short, many of the suggested contracts are not contracts at all, but
merely aspirational statements of goals and expectations, drafted by
couples who wish to order their own lives. Rather than helping these
people to arrange a more stable and equal partnership, these agree-
ments may inadvertently lead to hard feelings and bitterness when the
contracting couples disagree or ultimately separate. At that point many
may discover, to their surprise, that their so-called contract is no con-
tract at all.

